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	<title>CounterMeasures -  A Security Blog  spam</title>
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	<link>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu</link>
	<description>Trend Micro’s Rik Ferguson blogs about current security issues.</description>
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		<title>LinkedIn? OptOut!</title>
		<link>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/linkedin-optout/</link>
		<comments>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/linkedin-optout/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Aug 2011 10:40:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Rik Ferguson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[data leakage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Web 2.0]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cloud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data loss]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LinkedIn]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[web]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/?p=2967</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[UPDATE: It seems the Dutch government are already asking questions about whether this new behaviour breaches their data protection legislation. &#160; Having seen this blog post, the first &#8220;victim&#8221; of social advertising has come forward and he&#8217;s one of my own colleagues he tweeted a few days ago: &#160; &#160; Original Article _________________________________________________ &#160; In [...]<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/linkedin-optout/' addthis:title='LinkedIn? OptOut! '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>UPDATE:</strong> It seems the Dutch government are <a href="http://www.nu.nl/internet/2586724/pvda-twijfelt-privacybeleid-linkedin.html" title="PvdA twijfelt over privacybeleid LinkedIn" target="_blank">already asking questions</a> about whether this new behaviour breaches their data protection legislation.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Having seen this blog post, the first &#8220;victim&#8221; of social advertising has come forward and he&#8217;s one of my own colleagues he <a href="https://twitter.com/#!/Menardconnect/status/100542020271095808" title="Menard Osena on Twitter">tweeted</a> a few days ago:<br />
&nbsp;<br />
<div id="attachment_2987" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 410px"><a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Menard.png"><img src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Menard-400x164.png" alt="" title="Menard" width="400" height="164" class="size-large wp-image-2987" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Click to enlarge</p></div><br />
&nbsp;<br />
Original Article<br />
_________________________________________________<br />
&nbsp;<br />
In my periodic trawl through the account options and settings of the social networks I entrust with my data, I discovered a few new &#8220;features&#8221; on LinkedIn that really made me angry.In a move reminiscent of some other social network providers *cough*Facebook*cough*, LinkedIn have decided to introduce targeted advertising and &#8220;social advertising&#8221;.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
&#8220;<em>Yeah, big deal, I expect advertisements on web sites</em>&#8221; might be your initial reaction. Well, do you expect your own <strong>name, face and personal information</strong> to be used in those advertisements? If you don&#8217;t and you&#8217;re a LinkedIn user, you might want to log in today and have a look at your new <strong>default</strong> settings.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Once logged into LinkedIn, look to the top right corner where you will see your name in a drop-down menu, hold the mouse over your name and choose &#8220;Settings&#8221; in the menu that appears. This is where you can opt out of these new &#8220;features&#8221;.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
<div id="attachment_2968" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 410px"><a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/LIACCTSET.png"><img class="size-large wp-image-2968" title="LIACCTSET" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/LIACCTSET-400x144.png" alt="" width="400" height="144" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Click for a larger image</p></div><br />
&nbsp;<br />
Once you select the Privacy Controls you will be able to untick the boxes that have allowed your personal information to be used without your consent.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
<div id="attachment_2971" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 410px"><a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Enhancedetc.png"><img class="size-large wp-image-2971" title="Enhancedetc" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Enhancedetc-400x214.png" alt="" width="400" height="214" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Click for larger image</p></div><br />
&nbsp;<br />
While you&#8217;re in there, I hope you&#8217;ll be inspired to have a look around the other account settings, I&#8217;m sure you&#8217;ll find a few more that you will want to disable, like this little gem (in the Groups, Companies &#038; Applications section)&#8230;<br />
&nbsp;<br />
<div id="attachment_2974" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 410px"><a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Apps.png"><img src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Apps-400x106.png" alt="" title="Apps" width="400" height="106" class="size-large wp-image-2974" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Click for larger image</p></div><br />
&nbsp;<br />
LinkedIn have added these new features and opted all their 120 million users in without any form of notification, even though in my profile at least the option to get feature update mails was ticked (another default). I called the Information Commissioner&#8217;s Office in the UK and they confirned that this would be a breach of the Data Protection Act if the data were stored or processed in the UK.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
At the risk of repeating advice from yesterday be very careful what information you are sharing online, not only can you not trust strangers, but it appears you also can&#8217;t trust your social netowrk provider of choice to keep your details confidential, or even to notify you that they have statred sharing them, don&#8217;t forget, it&#8217;s not just LinkedIn&#8230;<br />
&nbsp;</p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Osama lives again on Facebook</title>
		<link>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/osama-lives-again-on-facebook/</link>
		<comments>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/osama-lives-again-on-facebook/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 May 2011 17:28:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Rik Ferguson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Family Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Web 2.0]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Facebook]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[malicious code]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[web]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/?p=2800</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Criminals are wasting no time in harnessing the undeniable impact of the news of Osama Bin Laden&#8217;s death to bait familiar old traps on facebook. &#160; I just got a call from, let&#8217;s call him &#8220;a concerned family member&#8221;, after he had been taken in by a facebook &#8220;chat virus&#8221;. &#160; The infection chain started [...]<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/osama-lives-again-on-facebook/' addthis:title='Osama lives again on Facebook '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Criminals are wasting no time in harnessing the undeniable impact of the news of Osama Bin Laden&#8217;s death to bait familiar old traps on facebook.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
I just got a call from, let&#8217;s call him &#8220;a concerned family member&#8221;, after he had been taken in by a facebook &#8220;chat virus&#8221;.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
The infection chain started with a chat message from a friend, the message read &#8220;<em>watch the video of them killing osama bin laden live!</em> <a rel="nofollow" href="http://facebook.com/pages/Osama-Bin-Laden-Killed-Live-on-Video/201198676585608?sk=app_190322544333196&amp;99276" target="_blank"></a>&#8221; and was accompanied by a link. The message began with the victim&#8217;s real name giving it added credibility.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
<a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/chat.png"><img class="alignleft size-full wp-image-2801" title="chat" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/chat.png" alt="" width="267" height="315" /></a><br />
&nbsp;<br />
The link leads to a page that may look familiar to those of you who keep up with this sort of thing, but as my br&#8230; um&#8230; concerned family member can attest, it still fools the unwary.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
<a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/jslure.png"><img class="alignleft size-large wp-image-2803" title="jslure" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/jslure-400x244.png" alt="" width="400" height="244" /></a><br />
&nbsp;<br />
The instructions on the page inform the unfortunate mark that in order to view the supposed execution video, they need to paste the &#8220;video code&#8221; into the address bar of the browser. This may seem an unusual request in the context of a blog post, but when the recommendation comes to you in a live chat message from a friend you know and trust, your spider senses may not be tingling quite so much.</p>
<p>&nbsp;<br />
The code that you are pasting into your address bar is a JavaScript that simply calls a second JavaScript file hosted on a compromised but otherwise innocent website. The second file enumerates all your friends and sends them chat messages, creates an event to which all your friends are invited and continually updates your facebook status. Meaning that the video link is immediately posted to your facebook wall to entice other unwary facebookers and spammed out in personalised chat messages and event invitations to your nearest and dearest (well, your Facebook friends anyway).<br />
&nbsp;<br />
The tactics used are exactly the same as in many of the <a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/whos-checking-your-facebook-profile-scammers/">&#8220;Profile Spy&#8221;, or &#8220;See who views your profile&#8221; scams </a>that do the rounds so often, in fact the offending JavaScript file in this instance even contains the line &#8220;<span style="font-size: small;"><em>var eventdesc = &#8216;Hey everyone, \n\ fb now lets you see who viewed your profile! to enable this feature, go here! -</em>&#8221; suggesting that this represents nothing more than a rebaited trap. </span><br />
&nbsp;<br />
<span style="font-size: small;">But hey, there&#8217;s an old saying in Tennessee &#8211; I know it&#8217;s in Texas, it&#8217;s probably in Tennessee &#8211; that says, fool me once, shame on &#8230; shame on you. It fool me. We can&#8217;t get fooled again (with thanks to GWB)</span><br />
&nbsp;<br />
What do we learn from this? I guess the simplest lesson is, if you receive an unsolicited link from someone, even someone you know, check with them first before you click. You never know, you could be doing them a favour and letting them know they have been duped. And NEVER paste ANYTHING that is not a URL into your browser address bar.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
It is also worth noting that this is not the only Osama scam currently spreading on Facebook, I also spotted many iterations of a second attack that uses <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clickjacking">clickjacking</a> in the form of a bogus CAPTCHA to fool users into posting the bait to their own walls.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
<a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/math.png"><img src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/math-400x320.png" alt="" title="math" width="400" height="320" class="alignleft size-large wp-image-2802" /></a><br />
&nbsp;</p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>70 million customers affected by the Sony breach</title>
		<link>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/70-million-customers-affected-by-the-sony-breach/</link>
		<comments>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/70-million-customers-affected-by-the-sony-breach/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Apr 2011 07:28:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Rik Ferguson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[data leakage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Site Compromise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Underground Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[compromise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data loss]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[email]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fraud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hacked]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hacktivism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[password]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[web]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/?p=2788</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The most recent update update from Sony unfortunately confirms the worst fears of many. Between April 17th and 19th an &#8220;unauthorised person&#8221; gained access to the personal information of Sony&#8217;s more than 70 million customers. The information confirmed stolen is as follows: &#160; &#8211; Name &#8211; Address &#8211; Email address &#8211; date of birth &#8211; [...]<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/70-million-customers-affected-by-the-sony-breach/' addthis:title='70 million customers affected by the Sony breach '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="http://blog.us.playstation.com/2011/04/26/update-on-playstation-network-and-qriocity/">most recent update</a> update from Sony unfortunately confirms the worst fears of many. Between April 17th and 19th an &#8220;unauthorised person&#8221; gained access to the personal information of Sony&#8217;s more than 70 million customers. The information confirmed stolen is as follows:<br />
&nbsp;<br />
 &#8211; Name<br />
 &#8211; Address<br />
 &#8211; Email address<br />
 &#8211; date of birth<br />
 &#8211; PlayStation Network/QRiocity login name and password and online ID</p>
<p>&nbsp;<br />
Information &#8220;possibly obtained&#8221;:<br />
 &#8211; Billing address<br />
 &#8211; Purchase history<br />
 &#8211; PlayStation Network/Qriocity password security question responses<br />
 &#8211; all above data for any dependent accounts (your children&#8217;s sub-accounts)</p>
<p>&nbsp;<br />
Although there is no evidence at this time that payment card information has been accessed, Sony are &#8220;unable to rule out this possibility&#8221; and are advising their customers accordingly.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
<strong>What does this mean for you?</strong> Well if you&#8217;re the type of person who tends to reuse your password across multiple web sites today&#8217;s the day to get out there and start changing that password and breaking that habit. Criminals now have your email address and common password, they may also have the answers to your security questions, which also tend to get reused.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
It is never a good idea to use the same password across multiple web sites, so try to have a unique one for every site you use. While this may sound complex and impossible to remember there is simple way to acheive this. Create a complex password using upper and lower case letters, numbers and special characters such as $%&#038;!. Devise a way to differentiate your password for each site you use, for example putting the first and last letters of the web site name at the beginning and end of your initial complex password, making it unique yet easy to remember<br />
&nbsp;<br />
As for those security or password reset questions, this is also one of the most common ways to break into an account. If you are asked to provide answers to “Security questions” consider whether the answers are really secure. Secure means that you are the only person who can answer the question. If the possibility exists to create your own questions, use it. If you are obliged to answer more standard questions such as “First school”or “First pet” remember the answer doesn’t have to be the truth, it only has to be something you can remember.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Aside from this, given the nature of the warning from Sony keep aeather eye on your bank statements for any unauthorised activity.<br />
&nbsp;</p>
<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/70-million-customers-affected-by-the-sony-breach/' addthis:title='70 million customers affected by the Sony breach '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></content:encoded>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Data mining for bad guys</title>
		<link>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/data-mining-for-bad-guys/</link>
		<comments>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/data-mining-for-bad-guys/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 05 Apr 2011 09:22:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Rik Ferguson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[data leakage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Phishing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Underground Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[compromise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data loss]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[email]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fraud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hacked]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Engineering]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/?p=2732</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#160; Over the past three days many of us have woken up to an unwelcome sight in our email inboxes. A notification that your email address was among those exposed in what may be the biggest data theft of its kind,  the data breach at the &#8220;database marketing vendor&#8221; Epsilon. Today I got my first one [...]<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/data-mining-for-bad-guys/' addthis:title='Data mining for bad guys '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><div id="attachment_2736" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 508px"><a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/05-04-2011-10-20-34.png"><img class="size-large wp-image-2736" title="Notification mail from Hilton HHonors" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/05-04-2011-10-20-34.png" alt="" width="498" height="101" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">My notification mail from Hilton HHonors</p></div><br />
&nbsp;<br />
Over the past three days many of us have woken up to an unwelcome sight in our email inboxes. A notification that your email address was among those exposed in what may be the biggest data theft of its kind,  the data breach at the &#8220;database marketing vendor&#8221; <a href="http://www.epsilon.com/">Epsilon</a>. Today I got my first one and I&#8217;m far from alone.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
The list of companies affected by this intrusion is already long, but seems to still be growing. The notification mail I received  was from Hilton HHonours, the loyalty scheme for Hilton hotels. Other affecetd companies include: American Express, BestBuy, Borders, Capital One, Citibank, Disney, The Home Shopping Network, JP Morgan Chase, Marriott Rewards, Ritz Carlton, TiVo, US Bank, Verizon &amp; Visa, to name but some.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
No details have been made available regarding how the data was accessed beyond the <a href="http://www.epsilon.com/News%20&amp;%20Events/Press_Releases_2011/Epsilon_Notifies_Clients_of_Unauthorized_Entry_into_Email_System/p1057-l3">initial statement</a> made on the 1st April by Epsilon and the breach notification mails continue rolling in to affected individuals.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Epsilon state that the &#8220;unauthorized entry into Epsilon&#8217;s email system&#8221; affected just 2% of their customers and that they comprise only a subset of the clients to whom Epsilon provide email services. Given the list of names of affected institutions known thus far then, you have to wonder if the attackers were able to browse the entire database at will and extract only what they considered to be the most valuable information.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Every notification email and also the public statement from Epsilon reassures us that &#8220;only&#8221; names and email addresses were &#8220;obtained&#8221; (read stolen) and that no other information, financial or otherwise is at risk. Unfortunately, this downplays the level  risk to customers and is also misleading.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Not only do the criminals know your name and email address, they know where you go shopping, where you bank, which hotels you stay at and much more. If you are unfortunate enough to have received multiple notifications, just imagine what kind of profile is now in criminal hands.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
The risk from spear-phishing (highly targeted phishing) is hugely increased as a result of this data breach and people should be more vigilant that usual when receiving emails from affected institutions that may request personal information.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
It is important to remember though, that phishing is not the only criminal activity facilitated by this fraud. This gold mine of information makes credible malicious mails much more simple to design. An email may appear to come from from an organisation or shop of which you are known to be a customer. It will be designed solely to get you to click on a link. In the complex world of online crime you are often only one click away from compromise and infection without any user interaction beyond that first click. If a criminal can own your PC, they don&#8217;t have to ask your for your personal details, they can simply take them, and much else besides.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
So, for those affected by this breach, (note to self):</p>
<ul>
<li> Pay careful attention to emails your receive in the coming months, perhaps years.</li>
<li> Never surrender personal information to a website without having used one of your own bookmarks to get there or typing it yourself (i.e. don&#8217;t follow links in mails).</li>
<li> Before giving out personal details, ensure that the connection is secured with SSL. You can see this is the case if the address starts with &#8220;<strong><em>https://</em></strong>&#8220;. If it&#8217;s not encrypted they don&#8217;t deserve your data.</li>
<li> Read the privacy agreement carefully before you hand over any details. If there is anything you are unhappy with reconsider your decision to sign up.</li>
<li> To better insure yourself against this kind of eventuality in future consider using unique addresses for each service, I wrote an article on how to easily achieve this <a href="http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/security-management/2011/04/02/hacked-off-protect-your-email-from-a-breach-40092330/">here</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;<br />
And for all of the companies out there that process, store or transmit personal data belonging to other people&#8230; <strong>ENCRYPT IT</strong>, no excuses, no get out clause. This is only the beginning and you owe your customers a duty of care.<br />
&nbsp;</p>
<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/data-mining-for-bad-guys/' addthis:title='Data mining for bad guys '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></content:encoded>
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		<slash:comments>9</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Email this!</title>
		<link>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/email-this/</link>
		<comments>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/email-this/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 12 Dec 2010 00:13:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Rik Ferguson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Web 2.0]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[email]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[web]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/?p=2517</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Spammers are abusing the social media sharing functionality of popular web sites, to bypass spam filters. &#160; I received an email this evening with the subject line &#8220;NYTimes.com: Money for Social Science&#8221;, turns out it was a story that a spammer had chosen to share with me from the New York Times web site. Of [...]<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/email-this/' addthis:title='Email this! '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Spammers are abusing the social media sharing functionality of popular web sites, to bypass spam filters.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
I received an email this evening with the subject line &#8220;NYTimes.com: Money for Social Science&#8221;, turns out it was a story that a spammer had chosen to share with me from the New York Times web site. Of course the spammer was not aware of my hidden passion for Social Science funding projects, he was simply trying out a new avenue to get his scam into my inbox.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
The article sharing functionality allows the sender to specify their own message to go along with the story and of course that was where the much more traditional 419 scam was to be found.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
<div id="attachment_2519" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 310px"><a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/NYT-Spam.png"><img class="size-medium wp-image-2519" title="NYT Spam" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/NYT-Spam-300x255.png" alt="" width="300" height="255" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Spam sent through NYT article sharing</p></div><br />
&nbsp;<br />
Although this tactic means that the Spam will be sent from an IP address that is unlikely to be blacklisted, and contain much content that is unlikely to set off a spam filter, it certainly doesn&#8217;t add any credibility, to a 419 scam at least.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
That said though, if this technique were to be adopted by criminals seeking to spread socially engineered malicious links it could be made to look much more convincing. Interestingly this abuse of the New York Times web site happens in spite of the fact that users need to create an account in order to share stories by email. Perhaps web sites offering this kind of functionality would do well to invest in technology to scan the content of their outbound emails in order to stomp on this sort of abuse. If it becomes widespread they are very likely to find themselves blacklisted which would be a serious blow to their social media capabilities.</p>
<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/email-this/' addthis:title='Email this! '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></content:encoded>
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		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Targeted to appeal to executive vanity</title>
		<link>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/targeted-to-appeal-to-executive-vanity/</link>
		<comments>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/targeted-to-appeal-to-executive-vanity/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Nov 2010 23:52:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Rik Ferguson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[data leakage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Phishing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data loss]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[email]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/?p=2467</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[A friend of mine received an &#8220;interesting&#8221; email today. The friend in question is a senior director with an global software company and this targeted spear phishing attack was clearly designed to appeal to his executive vanity. Presumably with the aim of harvesting enough details to build a valuable contact database. Click the thumbnail below [...]<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/targeted-to-appeal-to-executive-vanity/' addthis:title='Targeted to appeal to executive vanity '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A friend of mine received an &#8220;interesting&#8221; email today. The friend in question is a senior director with an global software company and this targeted spear phishing attack was clearly designed to appeal to his executive vanity. Presumably with the aim of harvesting enough details to build a valuable contact database. Click the thumbnail below to view the original mail.<br />
&nbsp;</p>
<div class="mceTemp">
<dl id="attachment_2469" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 160px;">
<dt class="wp-caption-dt"><a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/phsihymail.png" target="_blank"><img class="size-thumbnail wp-image-2469" title="Phishy Mail" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/phsihymail-150x150.png" alt="" width="150" height="150" /></a></dt>
<dd class="wp-caption-dd">Click to enlarge: The Phish!</dd>
</dl>
<p>&nbsp;<br />
The email in question was adressed to the victim&#8217;s correct first name and informs them that they have been<br />
&nbsp;</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;<strong>selected by the nomination committee to represent your industry in the Top 100 Business Leaders of 2010</strong>&#8220;</p></blockquote>
<p>&nbsp;<br />
All the unfortunate mark needs to do is &#8220;<em>verify your biographical information and obtain your photo and/or company logo prior to the upcoming publication deadline</em>&#8220;.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
There are a couple of clues in the mail that should serve as warning signs&#8230; Firstly there is no mention of when the spurious deadline actually falls, clearly an attempt to prolong the shelf life of the scam, also both URLs embedded within the mail have been obfuscated with URL shortening services.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
The eventual landing page of the phishing mail looks like the below:  <br />
&nbsp;<br />
<a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/top100.png"><img class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-2470" title="top100" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/top100-300x197.png" alt="" width="300" height="197" target="_blank" /></a><br />
&nbsp;<br />
If the mail itself wasn&#8217;t enough to make you suspicious, the website should be! It is one single page, there are no links to any contact or corporate information and the only quote on the site is of course unattributed. Finally the graphic on the site seems to suggest issues of the Top 100 magazine dating back to 2004, the domain was only registered in October of this year and of course the details of the registrant are protected.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
In the case of unsolicited mail, <em>always</em> look a gift horse in the mouth; after all that&#8217;s where the Greeks hid their spies. 
</div>
<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/targeted-to-appeal-to-executive-vanity/' addthis:title='Targeted to appeal to executive vanity '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></content:encoded>
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		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>A new twist on Facebook phishing</title>
		<link>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/a-new-twist-on-facebook-phishing/</link>
		<comments>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/a-new-twist-on-facebook-phishing/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Nov 2010 17:31:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Rik Ferguson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Family Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Phishing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Web 2.0]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data loss]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Facebook]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[password]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[web]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/?p=2451</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Facebook users have alerted me to some worrying looking unsolicited direct messages they have been receiving today. &#160; &#160; The messages, which purport to come from &#8220;FB Customer Care&#8221; warn that the unsuspecting victim is due to be &#8220;disconnected from our server due to several violations&#8221;. The nature of the violations is unspecified, but helpfully [...]<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/a-new-twist-on-facebook-phishing/' addthis:title='A new twist on Facebook phishing '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Facebook users have alerted me to some worrying looking unsolicited direct messages they have been receiving today.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
<div id="attachment_2452" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 499px"><img class="size-full wp-image-2452" title="FBphish" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/FBphish.jpg" alt="" width="489" height="444" /><p class="wp-caption-text">Facebook Phishing Message</p></div><br />
&nbsp;<br />
The messages, which purport to come from &#8220;FB Customer Care&#8221; warn that the unsuspecting victim is due to be &#8220;disconnected from our server due to several violations&#8221;. The nature of the violations is unspecified, but helpfully the scam artists (for that is indeed what they are) do offer a link where you can &#8220;Confirm your identity&#8221;<br />
&nbsp;<br />
If a user is concerned enough to click the link in the message they will be taken to a replica of the Facebook website claiming to represent Facebook Security. As you can see from the screen grab below, it&#8217;s not just about Facebook credentials. These enterprising fraudsters are also after your date of birth and email credentials too!<br />
&nbsp;<br />
<div id="attachment_2453" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 530px"><img class="size-full wp-image-2453" title="phishsite" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/phishsite.png" alt="" width="520" height="340" /><p class="wp-caption-text">Facebook phishing site</p></div><br />
&nbsp;<br />
I have already alerted the incident handlers at Facebook about these scam mesages and now I&#8217;ve alerted you. If you&#8217;re using Trend Micro we are already blocking access to the related phishing sites.</p>
<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/a-new-twist-on-facebook-phishing/' addthis:title='A new twist on Facebook phishing '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></content:encoded>
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		<slash:comments>10</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Facebook 419</title>
		<link>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/facebook-419/</link>
		<comments>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/facebook-419/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jun 2010 13:24:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Rik Ferguson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Family Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Web 2.0]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[419]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[advance-fee]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[email]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Facebook]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fraud]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/?p=2163</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[No matter how hard I try, I just can&#8217;t get away from people trying to give me money. &#160;   It&#8217;s an age old scam, older even than the venerable Internet; Advance-fee fraud also known as 419 fraud. Fortunately it is also a scam that anti-spam technology has become adept at spotting and blocking. So it&#8217;s [...]<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/facebook-419/' addthis:title='Facebook 419 '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>No matter how hard I try, I just can&#8217;t get away from people trying to give me money.<br />
&nbsp;  <br />
It&#8217;s an age old scam, older even than the venerable Internet; <a title="Wikipedia - Advance-fee Fraud" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advance-fee_fraud" target="_blank">Advance-fee fraud</a> also known as 419 fraud. Fortunately it is also a scam that anti-spam technology has become adept at spotting and blocking. So it&#8217;s no surprise to see that criminals are turning to alternative distribution mechanisms to try to snare their victims.<br />
&nbsp;  <br />
I just received I friend request on Facebook from (the no-doubt bogus) Mariam Mehdi and as you can see below, the content is unfortunately all too familiar<br />
&nbsp;  </p>
<p><div id="attachment_2165" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 515px"><img class="size-full wp-image-2165" title="Facebook419" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Facebook4191.png" alt="" width="505" height="464" /><p class="wp-caption-text">419 fraud mail received as Facebook friend request</p></div><br />
&nbsp;<br />
 <br />
 I was very pleased to note that, in the hour that passed between the message being sent and me checking my friend requests on Facebook, the offending Facebook user account and the any friend requests had been erased from the social network.<br />
&nbsp; <br />
Anyway, old scams never die, they just get <span style="text-decoration: line-through;">annoyingerer</span> more annoying. If you receive any of this junk, treat it the same as any other Spam, terminate with extreme prejudice.</p>
<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/facebook-419/' addthis:title='Facebook 419 '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></content:encoded>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>I&#8217;m starting with the man in the middle.</title>
		<link>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/im-starting-with-the-man-in-the-middle/</link>
		<comments>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/im-starting-with-the-man-in-the-middle/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Jun 2010 13:08:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Rik Ferguson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Family Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Web 2.0]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bot]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[chat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[exploit]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/?p=2141</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[ Researchers at the Technical University in Vienna have published details of an important evolution in Automated Social Engineering and proved the concept using IRC and Facebook chat. &#160;  &#160;  Many of you will be familiar with the idea of Spam bots when it comes to real time chat, if not I detailed a Facebook related [...]<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/im-starting-with-the-man-in-the-middle/' addthis:title='I&#8217;m starting with the man in the middle. '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong> Researchers at the Technical University in Vienna have </strong><a title="Honeybot, Your Man in the Middle for Automated Social Engineering" href="http://seclab.tuwien.ac.at/papers/autosoc-leet2010.pdf" target="_blank"><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;">published details</span></strong></a><strong> of an important evolution in Automated Social Engineering and proved the concept using IRC and Facebook chat.</strong><br />
&nbsp; </p>
<div id="attachment_2146" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 385px"><img class="size-full wp-image-2146" title="Robot Face" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/14412196_6df76d4f85.jpg" alt="Robot Face" width="375" height="500" /><p class="wp-caption-text">Robot Face from Garrette&#39;s Flickr Photo Stream under creative commons</p></div>
<p>&nbsp; <br />
Many of you will be familiar with the idea of Spam bots when it comes to real time chat, if not I <a title="Facebook Colon Cleansing spam via Mobile Web" href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/facebook-colon-cleansing-spam-via-mobile-web/" target="_blank"><span style="color: #0000ff;">detailed a Facebook related scam</span> </a>a while back that took advantage of this technique.<br />
&nbsp;  <br />
Classical chat spam bots operate in four distinct modes, the research paper describes them as &#8220;<em>Periodic bots</em>&#8221; &#8211; they simply post spam messages at regular intervals; &#8220;<em>Random bots</em>&#8221; &#8211; posting messages at random intervals; &#8220;<em>Responder bots</em>&#8221; &#8211; automating replies to other user&#8217;s messages and &#8220;<em>Replay bots</em>&#8221; which as the name implies simply replay previously recorded conversations.<br />
&nbsp;  <br />
The problem that scammers and criminals have to overcome with these technologies is the effectiveness of our natural suspicion and intuition. It turns out that, in the main, humans are particularly good at spotting when they are being spoken to by a computer. The researchers from Vienna have devised a way to overcome these natural defenses.<br />
&nbsp;  <br />
The paper details an application they call <em>Honeybot</em> which acts as a man-in-the-middle between two human correspondents, intercepting, diverting and, crucially, modifying messages sent between them in order to direct the conversation and engineer the victims into clicking links. Links which have been inserted by the attackers. According to the paper:<br />
&nbsp; </p>
<blockquote><p><em>&#8220;The general attack principle works with any chat system that allows the exchange of private messages. It is based on the traditional man-in-the-middle concept. Every instance of the attack involves two human users and a bot in the middle. Both users believe that they are talking to the bot, but in reality, their messages are forwarded back and forth as shown in the following example:</em></p>
<ul>
<li><em>bot -&gt; Alice: Hi! </em></li>
<li><em>Alice -&gt; bot: hello</em></li>
<li><em>bot -&gt; Carl: hello</em></li>
<li><em>Carl -&gt; bot: hi there, how are you?</em></li>
<li><em>bot -&gt; Alice: hi there, how are you?</em></li>
<li><em>Alice -&gt; bot: . . . </em></li>
</ul>
<p><em> </em></p>
<p><em>The bot looks perfectly human to both users because the entire conversation is reflected off the bot in the middle.</em>&#8220;</p></blockquote>
<p>&nbsp;<br />
 Not only are all communications proxied but the bot has the intelligence to be able to guess at the respective genders of the victims, use questions to take control of the direction of the conversation (usually to engineer a scenario where a link would normally be posted) or to simply replace links posted by one victim with pre-configured malicious links.<br />
&nbsp;  <br />
In their testing, the researchers inserted three different kinds of link, a simple IP address, a TinyURL shortened link and a MySpace link into conversations on three different IRC channels and they recorded up to an impressive 76% click through. In a similar but more limited experiment using Facebook chat, the click through rate was still impressive at 40%.<br />
&nbsp;  <br />
With those kinds of results, surely we can expect to see this kind of technology incorporated into cybercriminal campaigns in the very near future. Just like your mother always told you, don&#8217;t talk to strangers! In those situations where you really have to, then this is just one more reason to ensure that your security solution of choice is scanning for malicious URLs in real-time&#8230;</p>
<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/im-starting-with-the-man-in-the-middle/' addthis:title='I&#8217;m starting with the man in the middle. '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></content:encoded>
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		<slash:comments>5</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Who&#8217;s checking your Facebook profile? Scammers.</title>
		<link>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/whos-checking-your-facebook-profile-scammers/</link>
		<comments>http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/whos-checking-your-facebook-profile-scammers/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 14 Mar 2010 21:08:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Rik Ferguson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Family Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Web 2.0]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Facebook]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spamvertising]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Yet another variation on a Spam theme for Facebook to deal with tonight. I have identified at least 25 different copies of the same rogue app with names such as peeppeep-pro, profile-check-online and stalk-my-profile &#160;    A wave of applications have been published that promise to reveal the truth about which of your friends are viewing [...]<div class="addthis_toolbox addthis_default_style " addthis:url='http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/whos-checking-your-facebook-profile-scammers/' addthis:title='Who&#8217;s checking your Facebook profile? Scammers. '  ><a class="addthis_button_facebook_like" fb:like:layout="button_count"></a><a class="addthis_button_tweet"></a><a class="addthis_button_google_plusone" g:plusone:size="medium"></a><a class="addthis_counter addthis_pill_style"></a></div>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Yet another variation on a Spam theme for Facebook to deal with tonight. I have identified at least 25 different copies of the same rogue app with names such as peeppeep-pro, profile-check-online and stalk-my-profile</strong><br />
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A wave of applications have been published that promise to reveal the truth about which of your friends are viewing your Facebook profile. The promise is worthless and the apps are bogus.<br />
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<p><div id="attachment_1920" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 556px"><a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/ischecking1.png"><img class="size-full wp-image-1920 " title="Rogue App wall post" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/ischecking1.png" alt="Rogue App wall post" width="510" height="135" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Rogue App wall post</p></div><br />
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Facebook users may notice wall posts or receive notifications from their friends, unwitting victims all, encouraging them to install the rogue app, along with bogus assurances on its reliability.<br />
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 </p>
<p><div id="attachment_1927" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 590px"><a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/app.png"><img class="size-full wp-image-1927" title="Rogue App &quot;Configuration&quot; screen" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/app.png" alt="Rogue App &quot;Configuration&quot; screen" width="510" height="221" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Rogue App &quot;Configuration&quot; screen</p></div><br />
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The app itself is designed to look convincing enough, but none of the many &#8220;Continue&#8221; buttons it offers will activate some under-the-counter profile checking functionality, they will just push you into another Facebook app earning the scammer advertising revenue in the process.<br />
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 </p>
<p><div id="attachment_1921" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 614px"><a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/notifications.png"><img class="size-full wp-image-1921" title="Notifications from two versions of the rogue app" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/notifications.png" alt="Notifications from two versions of the rogue app" width="510" height="140" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Notifications from two versions of the rogue app</p></div><br />
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In an interesting twist on the now familiar theme, at least one version of the rogue app will create a photo montage of all the infected user&#8217;s friends, tag it so that they all receive notifications and then post the photo.<br />
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<p><div id="attachment_1922" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 607px"><a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/pictures1.png"><img class="size-full wp-image-1922   " title="Bogus photo montage from rogue app" src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/pictures1.png" alt="Bogus photo montage from rogue app" width="510" height="329" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Bogus photo montage from rogue app</p></div><br />
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These changes in scam tactics are clearly designed to overcome the changes that Facebook made recently to application functionality, including removing the ability for applications to send notifications directly.<br />
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I can see that Facebook are actively combating these applications as they are posted, even on a Sunday evening, which is commendable but&#8230; I said it first back in February 2009, isn&#8217;t it time Facebook at least had a review of their application publishing policy? The idea was dismissed back then, but now that these things are becoming a regular occurrence there must be a tremendous burden being placed on the incident response handlers at Facebook that could be better channeled into an application vetting process.<br />
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For now though, just don&#8217;t click the links, they will disappear from your streams as Facebook remove the offending apps. There is no officially sanctioned Facebook functionality that will allow you to view who has been checking your profile.<br />
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A quick look in your Photo stream will show you how widespread the victims of this scam are:<br />
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<div id="attachment_1941" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 546px"><a href="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/photostream.png"><img src="http://countermeasures.trendmicro.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/photostream.png" alt="Screenshot of my own Photo stream" title="Screenshot of my own Photo stream" width="510" height="452" class="size-full wp-image-1941" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Screenshot of my own Photo stream</p></div></p>
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